We study combinatorial auctions with bidders that exhibit endowment effect. In most of the previous work on cognitive biases in algorithmic game theory (e.g., [Kleinberg and Oren, EC'14] and its follow-ups) the focus was on analyzing the implications and mitigating their negative consequences. In contrast, in this paper we show how in some cases cognitive biases can be harnessed to obtain better outcomes.
INTRODUCTION
Research in algorithmic mechanism design typically assumes that bidders are utility maximizers, i.e., they maximize their value for the chosen alternative minus their payment. However, empirical evidence from behavioral economics suggests that this assumption is often inaccurate. In practice, individuals tend to exhibit different cognitive biases that are not captured by the classic model of utility maximization. For example, the price tag might affect their value for a bottle of wine (irrational value assessment); or they may attribute higher values to items once they own them (endowment effect).
A recent line of work in algorithmic game theory (Kleinberg and Oren 2014 and their followups [1-3, 14, 23, 24, 33] ) mathematically models and analyzes the behavior of agents that exhibit cognitive biases in planning settings. In contrast, in this paper we initiate the study of cognitive biases in the central setting of algorithmic mechanism design: combinatorial auctions. 1 Furthermore, this line of work mostly focused on analyzing the implications of cognitive biases and mitigating 1 In the context of algorithmic mechanism design, the only paper that incorporates behavioral assumptions that we are their negative consequences. In this paper we take a different approach and show that in some settings cognitive biases can be harnessed to obtain better outcomes.
Walrasian equilibrium is the traditional concept of market equilibrium. Roughly speaking, a market is in Walrasian equilibrium if there exists a price for each item such that every bidder is allocated his most profitable bundle and all items are allocated. Walrasian equilibria are attractive since they are simple and since their pricing structure is easy to understand. Not only that, it is also guaranteed that any allocation of such an equilibrium must be efficient (the "First Welfare Theorem").
A major downside of Walrasian equilibria is that often they do not exist at all. In the context of combinatorial auctions it is known that a Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed to exist when the valuations are gross substitutes [15] . This relatively small class of valuations is in a (formal) sense the maximal one guaranteeing existence [15] . In particular, a Walrasian equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist if the valuations are submodular.
In this paper we consider bidders in combinatorial auctions that exhibit an endowment effect. Our main contribution is utilizing the cognitive biases of the bidders to extend the valuations classes for which a Walrasian equilibrium exists: if bidders exhibit a mild endowment effect then a Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed to exist even when the valuations are submodular.
Before formally presenting our model and results, we now discuss the endowment effect.
Endowment Effect. Do owning items makes them more valuable to us? The Nobel Laureate economist Richard Thaler coined the term endowment effect [34] to explain situations in which the mere possession of an item makes it more valuable. An experiment by Knetsch 1989 provides a stark illustration: two groups of students received goods in return for filling out a questionnaire. One group received mugs and the other chocolate bars. Next, the students were given the option to swap items. Since the items were allocated to the students randomly, we expect that about half of them would have received the less desirable item and would like to switch. In contrary to this logic, 90% of the students in each group decided to keep their endowed item.
A classic experiment by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1990 attempts to quantify the endowment effect. In this experiment half of the students in a Law and Economics class at Cornell University received a $6 mug. After examining the mug, the students who received the mug were asked at which price are they willing to sell the mug (willingness to accept). The students who did not receive the mug were asked for the price they are willing to pay for the mug (willingness to pay). As in the Knetch's experiment, one could have expected that about 50% of the mug owners could be matched with a buyer that values the mug more than they do. However, in the experiment only 20% of the mug owners sold their mug. Moreover, there was a significant gap between the median price sellers were willing to sell at ($5.25), and the median price that buyers where willing to buy at ($2.25).
The endowment effect can be thought of as a special case of the status quo bias [31] , according to which individuals have a strong preference for the current state (i.e., a mug owner prefers to stay a mug owner). Kahneman et al. 1990 Kahneman et al. , 1991 claim that loss aversion from prospect theory [21] is the source of the endowment effect (i.e., for a mug owner exchanging the mug for a chocolate bar entails losing the mug). Kőszegi and Rabin 2006 incorporate reference points and expectations into prospect theory. Their framework suggests that the endowment effect will only appear in settings in which individuals do not expect to trade. 2 Masatlioglu and Ok 2005 propose a model in which the individuals make a rational choice on a constrained set of alternatives defined according to the status quo.
Several papers study endowment effect in auction settings (e.g., [17, 26] ). However, apart from [5] that discusses the endowment effect with multiple identical goods, all considered the single item setting, leaving open the question of incorporating the endowment effect into the more general combinatorial auctions setting.
The Model. We consider a combinatorial auction with n bidders and a set M of m items. Each bidder i has a valuation function v i : 2 M → R + that specifies his value for every bundle. The valuation function is non-decreasing and normalized (v i (∅) = 0).
Our modeling of the endowment effect is driven by the essence of this effect: an individual attributes an item a higher value after owning it; his value for items that he does not own remains the same. Formally, bidder i who previously valued item a at v i (a) will now value it at α i · v i (a) for some α i ≥ 1. 3 Similarly, when turning to the more general setting of combinatorial auctions we define the value of a bundle S i that bidder i owns as α i · v i (S i ). Note that it is insufficient to define the new value of bidder i only for the bundle S i , we also need to define how the value of any other bundle T changes when bidder i owns S i . We follow a similar line of reasoning: the value of the items in S i ∩ T is multiplied by α i , while the marginal contribution of the remaining items T − S i remains the same. Formally, we define the endowed valuation of player i with α i who is endowed with bundle S i to be: 4
Recall that a Walrasian equilibrium consists of an allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ) and prices (p 1 , . . . , p m ) such that:
(2) If j ∪ i S i then p j = 0. Several works attempted to relax the definition of a Walrasian Equilibrium in order to ensure existence [12, 13] 5 . Our approach is different; Given that the endowment effect changes the valuations anyways, we are simply interested in a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to the endowed valuations: an allocation S and non-negative item prices (p 1 , . . . , p m ) form an (α 1 , . . . , α n )-endowed equilibrium in an instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ) if they constitute a Walrasian equilibrium in the instance (v S 1 ,α 1 1 , . . . , v S n ,α n n ). When α = α 1 = . . . = α n we use the compact notation α-endowed equilibrium. Let S be the allocation and (p 1 , . . . , p m ) be the prices of some (α 1 , . . . , α n )-endowed equilibrium. Observe that S and (p 1 , . . . , p m ) also form an (α, α, . . . , α )-endowed equilibrium, for α = max i α i . The reason is
Thus, in the rest of the paper we let α = max i α i and focus on α-endowed equilibria.
Note that for α = 1 we recover the classic notion of Walrasian Equilibrium while, roughly speaking, as α goes to infinity the players insist more and more on keeping the bundle they were 3 The case 0 ≤ α i < 1 is also of conceptual interest. In particular, it models situations of the type "the grass is always greener on the other side", when a person values items less once he owns them. The analysis of this case is technically simpler and is provided in in the full version. 4 One can also give a "classic" interpretation that does not involve cognitive biases to this transformation: consider an environment with transaction costs, e.g., a company that acquires a new location might be subject to property taxes and/or have to invest in new infrastructure. Similarly, a shop that moves to a new location might have to start a costly advertising campaign to inform its costumers about the move. In all these cases after owning their resources the preference of the agents to the new status quo allocation increases. 5 define a conditional equilibrium where each player does not wish to add any items to the bundle he was allocated. Also related are works on simultaneous first [16] and second price [7] auctions. allocated. 6 Throughout the paper we say that α supports an allocation S if there exist item prices that together with S form an α-endowed equilibrium.
Results. Analyzing Walrasian equilibria in the context of endowed valuations brings with it a natural question: when does an endowed equilibrium exist? The simple answer is always; we show that in any instance there exists an α > 1 and an allocation for which an α-endowed equilibrium exists. However, this answer completely misses the point as the value of α for which an endowed equilibrium exists might be huge. Recall that the value of α corresponds to the intensity of the endowment effect, thus we expect α-endowed equilibria that arise in practice to have small value of α (in the experiment of [19] mentioned above, for example, it seems like α was about 2). This leads us to the definition of the endowment gap -the minimal value of α for which a Walrasian Equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. Thus, the main question that we ask in this paper is what is the endowment gap for different valuation classes?
Our main result shows that for submodular valuations there is always an allocation that is supported by α = 2. That is, in combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations the endowment gap is at most 2.
The proof of the theorem is constructive: an allocation is a local maximum if the welfare of the allocation cannot be improved by moving a single item from one player to another. We show that in any instance of combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations any local maximum is supported by α = 2. In contrast, the First Welfare Theorem asserts that the allocation in a Walrasian equilibrium is a global optimum. Hence, a local maximum that is not a global maximum can be part of a 2-endowed equilibrium, but cannot be a part of a Walrasian equilibrium.
Our work reveals interesting connections between the integrality gap of the linear program relaxation for combinatorial auctions and the endowment gap. Nisan and Segal 2006 show that a Walrasian equilibrium exists if and only if the integrality gap of a natural relaxation of the LP for combinatorial auctions (the "configuration LP") is 1, in other words, if and only if there is an optimal integral solution to the LP. This in turn implies that an (integral) allocation S is supported by α if and only if it is an optimal solution of the (fractional) LP with respect to the perturbed valuations.
An equivalent geometric interpretation is the following: consider the polytope defined by a given instance of a combinatorial auction. With submodular valuations, there might not be any optimal integral solution on a vertex of the polytope. Fix some allocation and consider the change to the objective function of the LP as α grows (changing the corresponding endowed valuations.) As α grows, the direction changes, rotating towards the direction of the endowed allocation.
The allocation can be supported by the minimal value of α (if exists) for which the (integral) endowment allocation becomes an optimal solution to the LP. For submodular valuations, our result shows that this happens quickly: when the allocation is a local maximum then a value of α of only 2 suffices.
It is not hard to see that the endowment gap is at least the integrality gap. However, note that the endowment gap is typically strictly larger. More generally, by analyzing the LP we give a precise definition for the minimal value of α required to support a given allocation. Roughly speaking, this minimal value of α that supports an allocation S must be bigger than some combination of the value of any fractional solution plus the "intersection" of this fractional solution with S. See a formal treatment in Section 3.1.
In fact, the LP point of view provides some interesting implications of our main result beyond the realm of endowed valuations: it is implicit in previous work that a local maximum in combinatorial 6 When α is very large this is similar to conditional equilibrium [13] as the bidders do not want to discard any item with marginal value greater than 0. auctions with submodular bidders provides a 2 approximation to the welfare maximizing solution.
One implication of our main result is that a local maximum provides a 2 approximation even with respect to the optimal fractional social welfare. More generally, the equilibrium allocation in an α-endowed equilibrium provides an α approximation to the optimal fractional social welfare. We also show that our analysis of submodular valuations is tight in the following sense: there is an instance in which any local maximum requires α ≥ 2 to be supported (but there are other allocations that can be supported by a smaller value of α). We also show that there is an instance with just 2 bidders in which every allocation requires α ≥ 1.5 to be supported. We thus conclude that the endowment gap for submodular valuations is between 1.5 and 2.
What about classes of valuations, like XOS or subadditive? Here we give a definite negative result: for every α > 1 there exists an instance with just two bidders with identical XOS valuations and three identical items in which the endowment gap is α ′ > α.
Open Questions. This work models the endowment effect in combinatorial auctions and analyzes the endowment gap. Our main finding is that every local maximum can be supported by α = 2 when the valuations are submodular and that the endowment gap for submodular valuations is at least 1.
An obvious open question is to close this gap.
A related open question is to analyze the endowment gap of subclasses of submodular valuations. For example, for budget additive valuations we are able to show that the endowment gap is also at least 1.5, but we are unable to prove that the endowment gap is strictly smaller than 2 even for this restricted class.
The focus of this paper is on characterizing the existence of α-endowed equilibria. An interesting follow-up question is to understand the "computational endowment gap": the minimal value of α for which an α-endowed equilibrium can be efficiently computed. One would hope that for submodular valuations a local maximum can be efficiently computed. Unfortunately, we show that there are both communication and computation hurdles in finding a local maximum: finding a local maximum in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders requires an exponential number of value queries. Moreover, we present a family of succinctly represented submodular valuations for which finding a local optimum is PLS hard. On the somewhat more positive side, we do know how to find with only polynomially many value queries an allocation (not necessarily a local maximum) that can be supported by some α > 1. However, this value of α is typically huge. Are there other allocations that can both be efficiently computed and supported by a small value of α? Remarkably, we are unable to provide an answer for this question for any reasonable value of α, not even for a restricted class like budget additive valuations. In fact, we do not know if finding a local maximum when the valuations are budget additive is computationally hard. This question might be of independent interest, regardless of the specific application to the endowment gap.
Another interesting question is to devise natural auction methods that end up with an endowed equilibrium. If the valuations are gross-substitutes, then there are natural ascending auctions that end up with a Walrasian equilibrium (e.g., [15] ). Are there natural ascending auctions that end up with an endowed equilibrium when the valuations are submodular? One question that might arise while developing such ascending auctions is to understand the extent to which bidders exhibit an endowment effect with respect to items that are temporarily assigned to them during the auction and take this temporary endowment effect -if exists -into account.
Finally, a natural measure of how far the market is from equilibrium suggests itself. Recall that a valuation v is c-approximated by a valuation v ′ if for every bundle S, v ′ (S )
Given valuations v 1 , . . . , v n , define the "distance to equilibrium" as the minimal c for which there exist v ′ 1 , . . . , v ′ n such that each v ′ i c-approximates v i and the instance v ′ 1 , . . . , v ′ n admits a Walrasian equilibrium. Since the endowment gap for submodular valuations is at most 2, this means that the distance to equilibrium of any instance with submodular valuations is at most 2. It will be , Vol. interesting to see if this result can be improved, e.g., maybe by using valuations that are not endowed valuations. Similarly, what is the distance to equilibrium of instances with subadditive or XOS valuations?
THE MODEL
There are n players and a set M of m goods, each agent i has a combinatorial valuation function
Each player i has a parameter α i that measures the intensity of his endowment effect. Specifically, if player i is endowed with a bundle S i , then his valuation function is
We will use both expressions interchangeably. An allocation S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) assigns to each agent i a set S i such that for every i j, S i ∩ S j = ∅. An allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ) and (non-negative) item prices (p 1 , . . . , p m ) constitute an (α 1 , . . . , α n )endowed equilibrium if:
. . = α n we shorten the name to α-endowed equilibrium. Let S be the allocation and (p 1 , . . . , p m ) be the prices of some (α 1 , . . . , α n )-endowed equilibrium. Observe that S and (p 1 , . . . , p m ) also form an (α, α, . . . , α )-endowed equilibrium, for α = max i α i . The reason for this is that when S i maximizes the profit of v S i ,α i i , it also maximizes the profit of v S i ,α ′ i , for every α ′ > α i . Thus, from this point onwards we let α = max i α i and focus on α-endowed equilibrium.
An allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ) is supported by α if there exist prices (p 1 , . . . , p m ) such that the prices and the allocation form an α-endowed equilibrium. In particular, in every instance in which a Walrasian equilibrium exists (e.g., every instance in which the valuation functions are gross substitutes), we obviously have an endowed equilibrium supported by α = 1. In instances where a Walrasian equilibrium does not necessarily exist, we will be looking for the minimal value of α for which an α-endowed equilibrium exists.
The conceptually and technically interesting regime is when α > 1, that is, a player assigns higher value for items in their endowment, but see the full version for the regime 0 ≤ α < 1.
In this work we are interested in the following valuations classes (each class is contained in its successor in the list):
THE ENDOWMENT GAP
Consider some instance of a combinatorial auction with n players with valuations v 1 , . . . , v n and a set M of m items. For a given instance, the endowment gap is, roughly speaking, the minimal value of α for which an α-endowed equilibrium exists in that instance. We are interested in proving bounds on the value of α for which an α-endowed equilibrium exists for all instances of classes of combinatorial valuations (e.g. submodular, XOS, subadditive).
We naturally extend the definition of an endowment gap to an instance and to a class of valuations:
• The endowment gap of an instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is the minimum value, over every allocation S, of the endowment gap with respect to the allocation S: min S G S (v 1 , . . . , v n ). • The endowment gap of a class of valuations V is the supremum over the endowment gaps over all valuations profiles in which each valuation belongs to the class V:
Next, we provide a simple characterization that shows that any allocation A that its social welfare cannot be improved by reallocating items that do not contribute to the social welfare of A, can be supported by some α > 1. 
Note that in particular, in a maximal allocation there is no bidder with zero marginal value for an item, for which some other bidder has positive marginal value given his set. Proposition 3.4.
(1) Every maximal allocation S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) can be supported by some α > 0. Furthermore, for a given allocation, we can find some α that supports it and the prices with poly(n, m) value queries.
(2) If an allocation S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) is not maximal then there is no α ≥ 1 that supports it.
The proof can be found in the full version. In addition, in the full version of the paper we use this characterization to show that not only in every instance there is an allocation that can be supported, but there is even some welfare maximizing allocation that can be α-supported by some α > 1. The caveat is that the α that we guarantee might be huge. In Claim 3.8 we give the exact value of the minimal α that supports an allocation S. However, even this precise characterization might result in large values of α. This is no coincidence: Proposition 5.1 shows that for every fixed α there is an instance for which the endowment gap is strictly bigger than α. Thus in most of this paper we restrict our attention to specific classes of valuations, aiming to find bounds on the endowment gap that hold for all instances in the class and, ideally, find prominent classes of valuations for which the gap is small.
The Endowment Gap and the LP Relaxation
In this section we explore the connections between the endowment gap and the following linear program relaxation for combinatorial auctions: • For each item j:
This linear program is tightly connected to the notion of Walrasian equilibrium: , . . . , v A n ,α n ) (implying in particular that the integrality gap of the latter instance is 1.) Furthermore, by the first welfare theorem we get that A is welfare maximizing with respect to
We can also relate the welfare of supported allocations to that of fractional allocations. In Subsection 4.1 we use the next corollary to improve the bounds on the welfare guaranteed by local maxima in combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations. Corollary 3.7. In an instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ), if an allocation A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) is α-supported then it provides an α-approximation to the maximum fractional welfare of the instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ).
Proof. Let {x i,S } be some fractional solution of the LP of the instance (v A 1 ,α 1 , . . . , v A n ,α n ). As the allocation A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) is α-supported, by Corollary 3.6 and the definition of endowed valuations we have that:
In particular, this holds for the welfare maximizing fractional solution of the instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ), implying that A provides an α-approximation to the value of that fractional allocation, as needed. □ As we will see next, the endowment gap has some interesting and useful connections to the integrality gap. For our first application, recall that Proposition 3.4 shows that an allocation can be supported by some α if and only if it is maximal. We now use the connection to the LP to determine the minimal value of α that can support a maximal allocation. Claim 3.8. Let A = (A 1 , ..., A n ) be some allocation. Given a fractional solution {x i,S } to the LP, define
Suppose that A is supported by α. Then,
The endowment gap with respect to A equals to 
Note that the combination of the above two facts already establishes that if A is α-supported then claim (1) holds.
We now continue to prove the second part. Rearranging, we have that A is α-supported if and only if for every fractional solution:
is composed of a sum of linear combinations of subsets of A i , for each player i (and the valuations are monotone).
If λ A, {x i, S } > 0 then obviously there is a large enough value of α such that inequality (1) holds.
in the RHS and the valuations are monotone.
If n i=1 S ⊆M x i,S · v i (S ) > ψ A, {x i, S } and λ A, {x i, S } = 0, which holds for any A that is not maximal, then no value of α makes inequality (1) hold and thus this allocation cannot be supported by any α. However, if n i=1 S ⊆M x i,S · v i (S ) = ψ A, {x i, S } then any value of α makes the inequality hold. We have thus identified that for an allocation not to be supported by any α it must be that there is some fractional solution {x i,S } for which λ A, {x i, S } = 0 and n i=1 S ⊆M x i,S · v i (S ) > ψ A, {x i, S } . If this is not the case then by rearranging inequality (1) we can determine the minimal value of α that supports A:
Note that the supremum is bounded, since we assume that A can be supported by some α. □ Claim 3.8 implies that the endowment gap is at least the integrality gap: take A to be any allocation and {x i,S } to be a fractional welfare maximizing solution:
and the right hand side is obviously at least the integrality gap.
However, as we will see in the paper, the integrality gap is usually strictly larger than the endowment gap. We now show that this is generically true for every instance with subadditive valuations with an integrality gap bigger than 1. The proof can be found in the full version. Claim 3.9. Consider an instance with two subadditive valuations. Suppose that the integrality gap of this instance is y > 1. Then, for every small enough δ > 0 there is an instance with integrality gap x = y · (1+δ ) (1+δ y ) in which the endowment gap is strictly bigger than x. The claim provides a generic way of proving lower bounds on the endowment gap of subclasses of subadditive valuations: start with an instance with the maximal integrality gap in the subclass. The claim guarantees that there is an instance with an endowment gap that is strictly higher than the maximal integrality gap. A more careful look at the proof shows that the new instance belongs to the subclass as long as the subclass is closed under sum, like submodular and XOS valuations (a class of valuations V is closed under sum if for each v, u ∈ V we also have that v + u ∈ V). We note that although the claim guarantees a generic method of proving lower bounds on the endowment gap, in the specific settings we study in this paper we are able to beat these bounds by introducing specific instances with stronger guarantees.
THE MAIN RESULT: THE ENDOWMENT GAP OF SUBMODULAR VALUATIONS IS AT MOST 2
Ö£In this section we prove our main positive result: the endowment gap for submodular valuations is at most 2. We prove this by showing that any allocation that is a "local optimum" of the social welfare function can be supported for α = 2 with prices that are equal to the marginal value of the items for the player that receives each item. We start by defining the notion of local optimum. 
In other words, in a local optimum every item is allocated to some player, and reallocating any single item does not improve the welfare. Note that any welfare maximizing allocation is in particular a local optimum. We are now ready to state our main positive result. Proof. We explicitly construct prices that show that O is supported by 2. For each item j ∈ O i we define its price to be p j = v i (j |O i − j). Using the following two claims we show that for α ≥ 2 the prices (p 1 , . . . , p m ) and the allocation (O 1 , . . . , O n ) form an α-endowed equilibrium. Later we will observe that our proofs hold even for lower prices.
We start by showing that with these prices and α ≥ 2, no player can gain by discarding items from his endowment. Claim 4.3. Consider player i that is allocated bundle S i . Suppose that the price of each item j ∈ S i is p j = v i (j |S i − {j}). Then, if α ≥ 2 the profit of player i from every bundle S ′ is at most the profit of
Proof. We compare the profit of player i from bundle
and rearranging the last expression, we get that the profit of bundle S ′ ∪ S i equals: 
Since α ≥ 2, it holds that α − 1 ≥ 1 and so to show this it is enough to prove that v i (S i − S ′ |S i ∩ S ′ ) ≥ j ∈S i −S ′ p j for every submodular valuation. Towards this end, denote the items in S i − S ′ by 1, . . . , |S i − S ′ |. With this notation we have that 1}) . Finally, observe that by submodularity we have that for every 1
We next show that with these prices, an agent can never gain by adding items to his endowment. Proof. Assume without loss of generality that O i ∩ T = ∅. Observe that since the allocation O is a local optimum we have that for any
Denote the items in T by 1, . . . , |T |. Since the valuations are submodular we have that:
where in the second-to-last inequality we use the submodularity of v i to claim that
We apply claims 4.3 and 4.4 to conclude the proof of the theorem. Let O = (O 1 , . . . , O n ) be a local optimum, recall that in a local optimum we have that ∪ n i=1 O i = M, and suppose that the price of each item j ∈ O i is p j = v i (j |O i − j). To complete the proof we show that any player i demands the set O i at the these prices. By Claim 4.4, for α ≥ 1 for any bundle T :
and by Claim 4.3 for α ≥ 2 and any bundle T :
Combining the two inequalities we get that for any α ≥ 2 and any bundle T :
We note that the proof still holds even if we reduce the prices such that the price of item j
. That is, the price p j can be reduced to the second highest marginal value for the item. The reason is simple: the profit of player i from the bundle O i has increased at least as any other bundle in this reduction, so as for the proof to hold we only need the price of each item to be the second highest marginal value.
An Implication: The Approximation Ratio of a Local Maximum
One interesting corollary of the algorithm is not directly related to the endowment gap. In previous work it was implicit that the welfare of any local optimum is at least half of the value of the welfare maximizing integral solution. By a direct application of Corollary 3.7, we are able to strengthen this result and show that the welfare of any local optimum is at least half of the welfare of the welfare maximizing fractional solution:
Proposition 4.5. Let (O 1 , . . . , O n ) be a local optimum. Let {x i,S } be some fractional solution for the LP presented in Section 3.1. Then:
Tightness of Analysis
The following proposition shows that considering local optima (or even global ones) will not help us prove a better bound than 2 on the endowment gap for submodular valuations: Proposition 4.6. For any δ > 0, there is an instance with submodular valuations in which every local optimum maximizes the welfare and these local optima cannot be supported by α < 2 − δ . In this instance there is another allocation that can be supported by α = 1.5 + δ .
Proof. Consider an instance with four submodular players (a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 ) and 2k +1 items (k ≥ 2). Each of the items belongs to one of the following three sets: X , Y , {c}, where X = {x 1 , ..., x k } and Y = {y 1 , ..., y k }. The valuations of the players are as follows:
• a 1 has a unit demand valuation with value 1 k for each of the items in X (and 0 for the rest). • a 2 has a unit demand valuation with value 1 k for each of the items in Y (and 0 for the rest). • The valuations of b 1 , b 2 are defined as follows: given a set T , let v T be the budget additive valuation with budget 1 that gives value 1 k for every item in T and value of 1 for item {c}. Then the valuation of b 1 is b 1 (S ) = v X (S ) + |S | · ϵ and b 2 (S ) = v Y (S ) + |S | · ϵ, where ϵ > 0 is small enough. Observe that the valuations of b 1 and b 2 are submodular as they are the sum of two submodular valuations.
We next show that up to symmetry, there is only one locally optimal allocation. In every local maximum item c must be allocated to either b 1 or b 2 as its marginal value for both is positive given any bundle, and a 1 , a 2 have a value of 0 for item c. Without loss of generality assume it is allocated to b 1 . Now, it is not possible that in a local optimum b 1 is allocated X ∪ {c} as his marginal value for each item in X is only ϵ, while a 1 values each item in X at 1/k. Thus, for ϵ < 1/k player a 1 must receive an item from X , without loss of generality item x 1 . Now, given any subset of X − {x 1 }, b 1 has positive value for any additional item in X − {x 1 }, and is the only player with such positive value, so he must get X ∪ {c} − {x 1 }. Finally, all items in Y must be allocated to b 2 as the marginal value of any item in Y (given any subset of Y ) is larger for b 2 than for any other player, in particular a 2 .
We conclude that in a local maximum, without loss of generality, a 1 is allocated
Fix some value of α that supports this allocation. First, we observe that for any j ∈ X − {x 1 }, b 1 (j |X ∪{c}−{x 1 , j}) = ϵ, thus p j ≤ α ·ϵ (otherwise the profit of b 1 from the bundle X ∪{c}−{x 1 }−{j} is bigger than the profit of his equilibrium allocation). Similarly, p c ≤ α · ( 1 k + ϵ ). Then, it must be that:
(1) b 2 prefers his allocation over item c:
(2) a 2 that has zero profit in equilibrium has a non-positive profit from items in Y : for every y ∈ Y , 0 ≥ 1 k − p y . Summing up all these inequalities with p c ≤ α · ( 1 k +ϵ ), we get that:
, which approaches 2 for k that approaches ∞ and a choice of ϵ = 1 k 2 . As for the second part of the proposition, we will now see that the allocation in which a 1 is allocated
and a 2 is allocated {y 1 } is supported by 1.5 + ϵ. To see this, we simply note that with this value of α the following prices constitute an equilibrium with respect to this allocation:
The Complexity of Finding a Local Optimum
Our proof that the endowment gap for submodular valuations is at most 2 starts with a local maximum (local optimum) (O 1 , . . . , O n ). Can such a local optimum be efficiently found? We next show that there are both communication and computation hurdles in finding a local optimum:
We first show that finding a local optimum in combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations requires exponential number of value queries. In addition, we show that there exists some family of succinctly represented submodular valuations for which finding a local optimum is PLS hard. 7 Both results hold even if there are only two players.
In light of the hardness of finding exact local optimum, one might be tempted to use an approximate local optimum instead, as it is computationally feasible to find, and hope it can be supported by a small α. However, it is easy to provide examples in which a (1 − ϵ )-approximate local optimum cannot be supported by any α. Consider a setting with two additive bidders and two items. The first additive bidder has a value of 1 − ϵ for item a, and ϵ for item b. The second bidder has a value of 0 for both items. Observe that allocating a to the first bidder and b to the second one is an (1 −ϵ )-local optimum. However, this allocation cannot be supported by any α: for the bundle {b} to be in the demand of the second player, the price of item b must be 0. However, the profit of the bundle {ab} for player 1 is then strictly bigger than that of {a}. We thus leave as an open question the problem of efficiently computing an α-endowed equilibrium for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders for a small value of α (in the full version we show that it is possible to efficiently compute an allocation that is supported by some huge α ≥ 1).
We now turn to proving the hardness results for finding a local optimum (proof in the full version): Proposition 4.7. Finding a local optimum in a combinatorial auction with two submodular valuations requires exponentially many value queries, even with randomized algorithms.
The proposition proves that finding a local maximum requires exponentially many value queries. The other common model for accessing the valuations is the more general communication model. That is, how many bits do the players need to exchange in order to compute a local optimum? One obstacle in proving hardness in the communication model is that the proof of Proposition 4.7 is based on the result of [32] which proves the hardness of finding a local maximum on the odd graph using value queries. An analogous result for the communication model was not known when the first version of the paper was written. 7 We will not give a precise definition here (see [18] for a formal definition), but the PLS class intuitively captures problems which admit a local search algorithm. An example for a PLS complete problem is finding a pure Nash equilibrium in congestions games [10] . However, inspired by our work, the paper [4] studies a communication variant of local search on the odd graph. Using this result and a very similar reduction to that of Proposition 4.7, we show: Proposition 4.8. The communication complexity of finding a local optimum in a combinatorial auction with two submodular valuations is exp(m). This results holds even for randomized protocols.
We give a sketch of the proof in the full version. Proposition 4.9. There exists a family of succinctly described submodular functions for which computing a value query can be done in polynomial time but finding a local optimum in a combinatorial auction with two valuations that belong to this family is PLS-hard.
Proof. We reduce from the PLS complete problem of finding a locally optimal cut in a graph G. In this problem, we are given an edge-weighted graph G = (V , E), and we are looking for a partition of the vertices (S, V − S ) such that the (weighted) cut cannot be improved by moving any single vertex from one side of the cut to the other.
We now reduce this problem to a combinatorial auction with two identical submodular valuations. The items in the combinatorial auction are the vertices of the graph. For each set of vertices S, we set v (S ) to be the sum of the weights of all edges that touch at least one vertex in S. It is not hard to see that this valuation is monotone and submodular.
Consider 
LOWER BOUNDS ON THE ENDOWMENT GAP
We now prove some lower bounds on the endowment gap. In Section 4 we have shown that the endowment gap for submodular valuations is at most 2. What about larger classes of valuations, such as XOS or subadditive valuations? In sharp contrast to the case of submodular valuations, we show that with the larger classes, the endowment gap cannot be bounded uniformly for the entire class, even if there are only two players. Note that this does not contradict our claim that for any instance, there exists an allocation that is supported by some α, as we now only show that for every fixed α there is some instance such that no allocation is supported by that value of α.
Proposition 5.1. Fix α > 1. There exists an instance that consists of only three identical items and two players with identical XOS valuations such that no allocation is supported by α.
Proof. Consider an instance with two bidders and three identical items x 1 , x 2 , x 3 . The valuations of the bidders are identical (since the items are identical we slightly abuse notation and use v (x ) to specify the value of every bundle S such that
We prove that this is indeed an XOS valuation by providing an explicit construction of the clauses of v: a clause (x j = 1) for every item x j , a clause (x j = 1 2 + 1 24α 2 , x j ′ = 1 2 + 1 24α 2 ), for every pair of x j ′ and x j , j ′ j, and a clause (x 1 = 1 2 , x 2 = 1 2 , x 3 = 1 3α ). Note that in every equilibrium allocation all items must be allocated: if item x j is unallocated, then its price is 0. However, since the valuations of the players are strictly increasing, the profit of his equilibrium allocation with x j is strictly bigger than his profit from his equilibrium allocation.
Thus, from now on we only consider allocations that allocate all items. There are two possible allocations that allocate all items (up to symmetry). We will show that both allocations are not supported by α. In the first allocation, one player, say player 1, gets all three items. The marginal value of an item for player 1 is 1 3α − 1 12α 2 < 1 3α . Thus the price of every item in equilibrium is at most α · 1 3α = 1 3 (if there is an item with a higher price, the profit for player 1 of the bundle that contains the other two items is higher than the profit of the grand bundle). In this case the profit of player 2 from taking one item is positive: 1 − 1 3 = 2 3 . A contradiction to the assumption that the empty bundle maximizes the profit of player 2.
The other allocation is when one player, say player 1, is allocated two items and player 2 receives only one item. This allocation is not supported by α as well: since v (1) = 1 and v (2) = 1 + 1 12α 2 , the marginal value of player 1 for any item is 1 12α 2 . Thus, taking the endowment effect into account, the price of each item that is allocated to player 1 cannot exceed 1 12α . But now the profit of the grand bundle for player 2 is strictly higher than its current single item allocation: the marginal value of player 2 for the two items that were allocated to player 1 is 1 3α , while the sum of prices of these items is at most 1 6α . We have reached a contradiction once again. □
For submodular valuations we can prove that the endowment gap is at least 3 2 . This leaves us with a small gap to the upper bound of 2.
Proposition 5.2. There exists an instance of two players with submodular valuations where the endowment gap is at least 3 2 . Proof. Feige and Vondrak 2006 show that the integrality gap of two players with submodular valuations is at least 6 5 . We now show that this example shows that the endowment gap is at least 3 2 . As mentioned, we have two players, call them Alice and Bob. There are 4 items, the value of each singleton is 1 the value of each bundle of three or more items is 2. The values of pairs of items are:
Alice Bob There are 4 possible allocations of all items (up to symmetry), and we will see that none of them is supported by α < 3 2 . We will use the fact that the value of the optimal fractional solution is 4 (Alice receives 1 2 
I.e., the profit of Bob from the bundle {cd} is strictly bigger than that of {d}. A contradiction to the assumption that there is an equilibrium.
(3) ({ab}, {cd}): Denote this allocation by A and note that its welfare is 10/3. Observe that: 
Similarly to before, by Claim 3.8, to support A we must have α ≥ 4−2 10 3 −2 = 3 2 . Finally, we note that the optimal integral allocation ({ab}, {cd}) is indeed supported by α = 3/2 by using the prices p a = p b = 1, p c = p d = 2/3. □
The above claim shows that if we have two players with general submodular valuations then the endowment gap is at least 3 2 . Next, we consider a more restricted class -budget additive valuationsand show that even in this much simpler class the endowment gap is essentially the same. However, we do need more players to show this. Proposition 5.3. For every ϵ > 0, there exists an instance of four players with budget additive valuations in which the endowment gap is at least 3 2+ϵ /2 .
Proof. We consider a modification of the integrality gap example of Chakrabarty and Goel 2010. We have 4 players (a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 ) and 5 items (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , c). a 1 , a 2 have budget 1, b 1 , b 2 have budget 2 + ϵ, for some arbitrarily small ϵ > 0.
To complete the definition of the valuations, we only need to specify the values of players for single items:
• Players a 1 and b 1 have value 1 for items x 1 , x 2 .
• Players a 2 and b 2 have value 1 for items y 1 , y 2 .
• Players b 1 , b 2 value 2 for item c.
• The rest of the values are 0.
To analyze the endowment gap we provide several lemmas that characterize the allocations that can be supported in an endowed equilibrium. We then show that each of these allocations can be supported only by α ≥ 3 2+ϵ /2 . Lemma 5.4. Without loss of generality, in an endowed equilibrium b 1 is assigned item c.
Proof. We claim that in equilibrium item c must be allocated to one of the players b 1 , b 2 . If c is not allocated, then its price must be 0. The same holds if c is allocated to player a 1 or player a 2 , the value of both players for c is 0. Now observe that each player b i has three items with positive value, and that b 1 (c |{x 1 , x 2 }) = ϵ > 0. Thus, when p c = 0, the profit of player b 1 from a bundle that contains c is always strictly bigger than his profit from a bundle without it. The argument for player b 2 is identical, and thus without loss of generality in equilibrium b 1 is assigned item c. □ Lemma 5.5. Without loss of generality, in an endowed equilibrium player b 2 is assigned at least one of y 1 , y 2 .
Proof. Observe that if player b 1 was not assigned any of the items y 1 , y 2 , then his profit is 0, since he has positive value only for items c, y 1 , y 2 and did not get any of them. The only other player with positive value for y 1 and y 2 is a 2 . However, if a 2 receives the bundle {y 1 , y 2 } the marginal contribution of any of these items is 0, thus the price of both of these two items is 0. In that case, the profit of player b 2 from the bundle {y 1 } is strictly positive and is bigger than his 0 profit in equilibrium, which is a contradiction. □ Lemma 5.6. Without loss of generality, in an endowed equilibrium a 1 is assigned item x 2 . Proof. We can claim that player a 1 is allocated at least one of x 1 , x 2 : the only other player with positive value for these items is b 1 . Now, b 1 is already assigned item c, so the marginal contribution of the item is at most ϵ and thus the price is at most α · ϵ. For ϵ < 1 α , α · ϵ < 1 and the bundle {x 1 } has a positive profit for player a 1 . This profit is bigger than his 0 profit in equilibrium. □ Lemma 5.7. Without loss of generality, in equilibrium player b 1 is assigned x 1 and p x 1 < α · ϵ.
Proof. Observe that x 1 can only contribute positively to players a 1 , b 1 and that a 1 (x 1 |{x 2 }) = 0. Thus, if x 1 is allocated to a 1 then its price must be 0, but then b 1 (x 1 |{c}) > 0, which implies that b 1 profit increases when he adds x 1 to his bundle. Similarly to before, this means that this is not an equilibrium allocation. Also, similarly to the previous lemma, p x 1 < α · ϵ. □ This leaves us with the following two allocations that can be supported (up to symmetry):
(1) b 1 gets {c, x 1 }, b 2 gets {y 1 , y 2 }, a 1 gets x 2 : in this case we have: (a) b 2 prefers his allocation over item c: 2 · α − p y 1 − p y 2 ≥ 2 − p c . (b) a 1 prefers his allocation over item x 1 (recall that p x 1 ≤ α · ϵ): α − p x 2 ≥ 1 − ϵ · α.
(c) b 1 prefers his allocation over {x 1 , x 2 }: 2 ·α −p c ≥ 1+α −p x 2 (by rearranging α −p c ≥ 1−p x 2 ). (d) a 2 that has zero profit in equilibrium has a non-positive profit from y 1 and y 2 : 0 ≥ 1 − p y 1 , 0 ≥ 1 − p y 2 . Summing these inequalities we get that α · (4 + ϵ ) ≥ 6. I.e., to support this allocation we need α ≥ 3 2+ϵ /2 . As ϵ approaches 0 this ratio approaches 3 2 .
(2) b 1 gets {c, x 1 }, b 2 gets y 1 , a 1 gets x 2 , a 2 gets y 2 :
(a) b 2 prefers his allocation over item c: α − p y 1 ≥ 2 − p c . (b) b 2 prefers his allocation over {y 1 , y 2 }: α − p y 1 ≥ α + 1 − p y 1 − p y 2 . Hence p y 2 ≥ 1.
(c) a 1 prefers his allocation over item x 1 (recall that p x 1 ≤ α · ϵ): α − p x 2 ≥ 1 − ϵ · α.
(d) b 1 prefers his allocation over {x 1 , x 2 }: 2 · α − p c ≥ 1 + α − p x 2 . (e) a 2 prefers his allocation over item y 1 : α − p y 2 ≥ 1 − p y 1 . Summing these inequalities we get that α · (4 + ϵ ) ≥ 6. I.e., to support this allocation we need α ≥ 3 2+ϵ /2 . As ϵ approaches 0 this ratio approaches 3 2 . □
